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Abstract 
 This study aims at providing an assessment about real convergence across 
countries and regions in the EU, focusing more specifically on the four cohesion EU 
members (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece), since they seem to be more appropriate 
to draw lessons for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The results 
obtained when making an assessment of real convergence in the EU, both at country and 
regional level, show that in the course of the last few years a process of convergence has 
taken place between the per capita income levels of the EU regions and also, to a larger 
extent, of the Member States. Nevertheless, also marked differences could be identified: 
Ireland is undoubtedly the most successful of the four, while Greece showed the least 
satisfactory performance. 
 In this respect, the differences that may be observed between these countries suggest 
that advances in real convergence are far from being a spontaneous outcome of the 
accession to the EU, but largely determined by the growth strategy implemented by the 
countries themselves. Lastly, our study suggests that the Community’s regional policy has 
played a significant role in favor of real convergence between the Member States of the 
EU. However, the experience of Greece indicates that the impact of EU’s financial 
assistance on the beneficiary countries depends not only on its amount, but also on the 
efficiency with which its allocation is carried out.  
 One important lesson to be drawn is that the accession is likely to contribute 
significantly to improving the possibilities of the current CEECs candidates in aligning 
their per capita income levels with those of the more advanced current EU members. 
However, we have also learnt that the prospects of growth and income convergence 
towards EU levels in the current candidates will depend crucially on the measures taken 
by each country, and particularly on their capacity to invest more and more efficiently. 
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Foreword 
by János Gács 
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the 
Economic Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU 
Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was 
particularly encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member 
organizations, while financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national 
member organization, the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research 
(FRN). Preparations for the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of 
communication two workshops, one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm 
in May 2001, helped to elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work 
and discuss results. Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects 
started in September 2001. 
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows. 
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is 
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless 
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs 
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the 
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and 
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU 
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social 
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the 
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided 
under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching 
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development 
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is 
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this 
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and 
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is 
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities. 
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which 
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process 
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different 
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and 
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the 
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied. 
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The following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the 
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs; 
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member 
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed 
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of 
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the 
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected 
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible 
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries' development based on the  
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate 
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of 
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human 
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context 
of EU accession. 
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Real Convergence and European Integration: The Experience of 
the Less Developed EU Members 
Carmela Martín 
Ismael Sanz 
1. Introduction 
 The issue of real convergence - the reduction of economic inequality between 
countries (regions) - has been capturing the attention of policy-makers and researchers 
in recent years. This issue is specially important in the European Union (EU), where the 
goal of economic and social cohesion aimed at reducing disparities between member 
countries and regions is included in the Maastricht Treaty. It is not only of major 
importance for the present Member States, but will also become crucial in the context of 
the eastern enlargement of the union. Thus, testing the existence of real convergence is a 
key task of economic research that has implications for national and EU policies, in 
particular the EU regional policy channeled mainly through the Cohesion and Structural 
Funds. 
 Although our understanding of the question of real convergence has grown since 
the mid 1980s, neither economic theory nor empirical evidence available provide an 
unambiguous proof for the existence of real convergence. Indeed, apart form the 
ambiguity of theoretical predictions there are difficulties involved in the measuring of 
real convergence.  
 In this context, this study aims at providing an assessment about real convergence 
across countries and regions in the EU, focusing more specifically on the four cohesion 
EU members (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece), since they seem to be more 
appropriate to draw lessons for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), 
that have already started accession negotiations.  
 Section 2 briefly summarizes the soundest hypotheses in growth literature 
regarding the convergence versus divergence debate. Then, section 3 discusses the 
possible ways for measuring real convergence and, on this basis, it provides an 
assessment of real convergence patterns in the EU. In this respect, it offers first an 
overall view of the fifteen EU members, at both  national and regional levels, and 
secondly it focuses on the four cohesion countries. Section 4 analyzes the likely 
explanatory factors that may account for the differences in these catch-up experiences. 
Here, we begin by taking into account the peculiarities of the growth strategies of the 
cohesion countries concerning the domestic efforts to improve their technological 
capability and capital endowments. Then, we explore the likely contribution of 
international technological spillovers. And, finally, we examine the role played by the 
EU’s regional policy. Section 5 concludes and offers some final remarks regarding the 
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extent to which the experiences of the four Cohesion EU members can be useful for the 
Central and Eastern European candidates. 
2. Economic growth theories and the convergence versus divergence 
debate 
 Broadly speaking, real convergence in an area formed by different countries 
(regions) is understood to mean the approximation of the levels of economic welfare - 
generally proxied by per capita GDP - across those countries (regions). So, the question 
of real convergence has to do with the study of economic growth, which in turn has 
traditionally been approached through an aggregate production function. Using this 
approach, two main groups of models - the neo-classical and the new endogenous 
growth models - arrive at very different predictions of real convergence. 
 The neo-classical growth models - as in Solow (1956) and his following versions, 
for example Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) - imply convergence between poor and 
rich countries (regions). In these models, output per worker can rise only if the ratio of 
capital per worker increases or if technology (i.e. total factor productivity) improves. 
Then, assuming that technologies are identical and exogenous, the mechanism behind 
convergence rest on the diminishing  returns to capital: countries (regions) with low 
capital stocks and per capita income should have a higher marginal product and return 
to capital. This should therefore lead to more capital accumulation and faster growth in 
poor countries (regions) than in rich ones. 
 Consequently, opening up the country (region) - as happens in the framework of 
an integration process - would only accelerate the convergence process, as capital 
should flow to capital-scarce countries (regions) to benefit from higher returns. This is, 
in fact, the line of reasoning that is in the conventional theory of economic integration 
developed since the pioneering work of Viner (1950)1. Thus, those models  -  sharing 
the assumptions of neo-classical growth theory  -  predict a tendency that in the member 
countries, prices, costs and income levels converge, with trade and international factor 
mobility acting as the convergence mechanisms. This process of real convergence is 
further stimulated in the case of monetary union by the reduction of transaction costs 
and the elimination of foreign-exchange uncertainty. 
However, the new more sophisticated growth models developed in the 1980s do 
not predict that income convergence between rich and poor countries (regions) is the 
only possible outcome2. Thus, according to one of its first contributions, Romer (1986), 
returns to capital do not have to be diminishing. From this it follows, therefore, that the 
impact of economic integration on convergence is not so clear as in the Solow setting. 
In the approach proposed in Lucas (1988), where human capital with increasing returns 
is the main driving force of economic growth, the possibility of the brain drain acting as 
a vehicle of cross country growth divergence is considered. Finally, in some versions of 
                                                 
1
 Hine (1994) and Baldwin and Venables (1995) offer revisions of the theory and summarize the 
results of the main empirical studies.  
2
 A detailed overview of endogenous growth models developed since the early 1980s can be found 
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); Grossman (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998), and a recent 
survey of the empirical evidence is presented in Temple (1999). 
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endogenous growth models, in  the same vein as Romer's (1990), the importance of 
commercially oriented R&D efforts has been emphasized as the main engine of growth, 
thus also explaining the existence of permanent, and under some circumstances, even 
widening, technological and income gaps between countries. 
 In addition, the new economic geography literature pioneered by Krugman (1991) 
and reviewed in Ottaviano and Puga (1998) pose several reasons, in particular the 
existence of agglomeration economies, to explain why economic integration may lead to 
a pattern of increased spatial income inequality. 
 Since the neo-classical and endogenous models have different views on the 
mechanisms and processes generating growth and convergence (divergence), they have 
different implications for public policy. 
 In the neo-classical model, policy does not have an impact on the long run rate of 
growth, given that it predicts that poorer economies will grow faster than rich ones and 
converge to the same long-run equilibrium level of income.  
 In the endogenous models, however, income convergence need not occur. 
Government policy can, therefore, positively affect the long-run growth rate through 
economic incentives for the accumulation of various forms of capital and through the 
promotion of technological innovations. Thus, pro-active regional policy may play a 
significant role in achieving convergence. 
Nevertheless, some recent versions of endogenous growth models point to more 
optimistic prospects for international (and interregional) convergence.  A characteristic 
feature of these models is that they assume the existence of knowledge spillover effects 
of an international scope. Thus, by considering that imitation is cheaper than innovation, 
these models imply that convergence through technological diffusion is a likely 
outcome3. Apart from taking into account contracts for transfer of technology, they 
emphasize the role of trade and foreign direct investment as channels for technology 
spillovers.  
Studies that - such as Nadiri (1993), Nadiri and Kim (1996), Coe and Helpman 
(1995), and Keller (1999) - are focused on technology spillovers spread by trade 
underline the special importance of transactions in intermediate goods. Yet they also 
admit this role for trade in final goods, in particular in those ones that allow for reverse 
engineering practices by the importing country. As for the technology spillover effects 
through foreign direct investments, there are a great number of studies – see for 
example Blomström and Wolff (1994), and Baldwin, Braconier and Forslid (1999) and 
the references therein - which agree on the importance of these effects for growth in the 
host countries.  
In this respect, the most elaborated and realistic formulations of innovation-
driven growth models also stress the complementarity between both domestic R&D and 
foreign R&D spillovers and human capital investments. Thus, both the level (stock) and 
rate of investment in human capital prove crucial for growth not only as a separate 
factor, but also as a complement to exploiting the effects of new technologies created by 
                                                 
3
 Note here that historians have always argued that technology transfer favored by relatively cheap 
imitation –what Gerschenkron called the “advantage of backwardness” is a key driving force 
behind economic growth. 
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either domestic or foreign innovation efforts4.  In this sense, human capital is usually 
considered as an essential condition for convergence.  
In addition, some studies – see as an example Aschauer (1989, 2000), Munnell 
(1990), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), and Argimon et al. (1997) - underscore the 
importance of public capital in general, and more specifically the endowment of 
infrastructure, because of their significant positive externalities on the productivity of 
companies. Those externalities seem to be particularly big in the case of the transport 
and communication infrastructure (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Roller and Waverman, 
1994). Moreover, as for telecommunication and the internet infrastructure, it has been 
put forward how important they are for the technological upgrading of  the whole 
productive system  (Crandall, 1997; and Koski and Majumdar, 2000).  
Interestingly, some authors argue that at the present time those infrastructures 
associated with telecommunications and the internet are a key determining factor of 
growth given their crucial role in the diffusion of the radical innovations that have been 
taking place in the last few years. In this respect, the term general purpose technologies 
has been introduced (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) to refer to a certain type of 
drastic innovation, that has the potential for pervasive use in a wide range of sectors in 
ways that radically change their modes of operation. In fact, we already have a 
significant number of insightful studies, which illustrate the nature of general purpose 
technologies, the Internet in particular, and their far-reaching and enduring implications 
for economic growth and welfare (see Helpman, 1998 and references therein). 
What is more, for some of the supporters of this view those radical and pervasive 
innovations in the area of information and communication technologies imply the birth 
of the so called “new economy”. What is meant under this concept is a revolutionary 
change in the modes of production and in the behavior of both economic agents and 
institutions, which is making our inherited economic knowledge obsolete. Without 
going so far, one cannot but admit the paramount importance of those new technologies 
as determinants of both the level and the “quality” of economic growth. 
Summing up, the literature reviewed above leaves one with rather inconclusive 
predictions as to the question of whether or not economic integration is able to produce 
real convergence between country members of an economic union by itself.  
Thus, when the rather rigid assumptions of the pure neo-classical growth model 
are relaxed, particularly that production technologies are identical and exogenous across 
countries, opening up to trade and factor mobility may become a source of divergence. 
Indeed, in some versions of endogenous growth models integration, although still 
leading to aggregate welfare gains, may be conducive to income polarization processes.  
 Nevertheless, the majority of evidence available suggests that a trend towards real 
convergence is the most likely outcome, although it is generally considered that this will 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, as argued in Cannon (2000), there is a tendency to integrate the two existing approaches 
to analyzing the relationship between education and growth. The first, initiated by Lucas (1988) is 
based on the idea that growth is primarily driven by the rate of accumulation of human capital. The 
second, which has its origin in the contribution by Nelson and Phelps (1966), describes growth as 
being driven by the stock of human capital, which in turn affects a country's ability to generate and 
imitate technical progress. 
 5
be a kind of conditioned convergence. More specifically, what is suggested that laggard 
member countries need to boost efficient investments to enlarge and improve their 
endowments in all those kinds of capital assets with special influence on growth, 
namely: technology, human capital and infrastructure. In addition, most of those models 
argue that the existence of international technological spillovers make it possible to 
implement a strategy of growth based on a less costly way of imitation of foreign 
innovations, provided that the country has a good enough human capital endowment. 
Here it is also underlined how important it is for any strategy of growth to have the 
provision of good telecommunication infrastructures.  In addition, the need for keeping 
a climate of macroeconomic stability that favors the investments in all those kinds of 
capital assets required to achieve a sustained economic growth has been pointed out as 
well. 
3. An assessment of real convergence patterns in the EU 
 This section aims at arriving to a general assessment of the real convergence 
patterns in the EU, although focused on the case of the four less developed members. 
For this purpose, it first proceeds to make a brief overview of the main indicators used 
for measuring real convergence between countries (regions). 
3.1. The measuring of real convergence 
 There are many ways of looking at income or real convergence. Thus a choice 
must first be made as to the spatial units of reference: countries or regions. Then, one 
needs to choose among the different concepts and indicators available for that purpose. 
 Indeed, what we have in the specialized literature - see Baumol, Nelson and Wolff 
(1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Quah (1993, 1996), and Boyle and McCarthy 
(1997, 1999) for references - is a wealth of measures and an open debate on their 
relative merits. 
The simplest indicator for assessing real convergence between countries 
(regions) within an area is to test whether the relative per capita GDP of a country 
(region) or a set of countries has approached the average of the area. 
The two most popular measures are: the beta-convergence and sigma-
convergence. The former implies that the poor countries (regions) grow faster than the 
richer ones and it is generally tested by regressing the growth in per capita GDP on its 
initial level for a given cross-section of countries (regions). In turn, this beta-
convergence covers two types of convergence: absolute and conditional (on a factor or a 
set of factors in addition to the initial level of per capita GDP). Under sigma-
convergence we mean the reduction of per capita GDP dispersion within a sample of 
countries (regions) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:11) for further details). 
The methodology proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin to test beta- convergence 
has been criticized for producing biased results. In this sense, in Quah (1993 and 1996) 
it is argued that this measure largely neglects the dynamics of changing national 
(regional) income distributions. In addition, this author identifies a tendency towards 
“twin peaks” in the cross country distribution, so that the world appears to polarize into 
distinct classes of income. In other words, countries seem to follow different growth 
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paths and to converge to distinct steady states, so that they tend to cluster around 
different levels of per capita GDP. In this respect, Quah (1995) proposes the use of a 
very complex method based on the use of Markov chains to capture the dynamics of the 
entire cross-county distribution.  
 More recently, Boyle and McCarthy (1997 and 1999) have suggested the use of 
the Kendall index of rank concordance - referred to as gamma-convergence - in addition 
to sigma-convergence in testing for beta-convergence. That measure seems, therefore, 
more adequate to capture the possible mobility of countries (regions) within the 
distribution of income levels over time. 
 In any event, it may be claimed that none of the existing procedures is generally 
accepted as inherently superior to the others in any circumstances. In fact, what we find 
is a wide agreement about the idea that the relative merits of each of the measures may 
differ depending on what the purpose of the empirical analysis is. In this sense, our 
purpose in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, our interest is to get on overall 
picture of real convergence in the EU, at both national and regional levels. On the other 
hand, we are particularly interested in assessing the achievement in real convergence for 
each of the four cohesion countries within the EU. 
 Consequently, below we use first regressional analysis for testing absolute and 
conditional β convergence - complemented by the σ and γ tests - in order to achieve a 
global assessment of real convergence in the EU. And, secondly, we take the simplest of 
the above-mentioned indicators, the trend in the gap to the EU average, so that we can 
analyze the relative catch-up process of each of the cohesion countries.  
3.2. National and regional convergence in the EU: an overall view 
 On the basis of the convergence indicators that were set out in section 3.1 we 
carry out here an assessment of the trend in real convergence in the EU. Before that, 
however, we calculate three indicators  -  rank, Gini and Theil's indexes -, generally used 
by the European Commission in its reports on economic and social cohesion in the EU5. 
Accordingly, beginning with rank index, the values obtained in the two reference years, 
1986 and 19986, show that the difference between the richest and the poorest regions has 
diminished. Specifically, at the start of the period Hamburg - the most prosperous region - 
had a relative per capita income (198.5%) six times higher than that of Thüringen (33.3%), 
whereas by 1998 the rank was calculated to be at 185.5% for the selfsame Hamburg and 
at 41.8% for Ipeiros7. If the rank index is applied across the ten richest and ten poorest 
                                                 
5
 In fact, the Directorate General XVI for Regional Policy has produced a number of reports 
analyzing convergence and inequality across the regions and Member States: these are the First 
Cohesion Report (1996) and Second Cohesion Report (2001) as well as the periodic reports on the 
situation of the regions, the latest edition of which is the Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and 
Economic Situation and Development of Regions in the European Union (1999). 
6 
 1986 is the year in which Spain and Portugal joined the EU, and 1998 is the last year for 
which data on GDP per capita are available. 
7
 The EUROSTAT regional per capita income series does not have data prior to 1989 for the new 
Länder of Germany. It was therefore decided to assume that the relative per capita income 
remained stable on the eve of reunification (1986-1988).  
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regions, a similar conclusion is reached, as the relative per capita income of the former 
decreased from the 172.2% of 1986 to the 165.6% of 19988, whereas in the latter it 
increased from 37.1% to 51.4%. If the analysis is extended to 25 regions each, it may be 
observed that, although the per capita income of the most prosperous set of regions has 
remained stable at around 148.0%, that of the least prosperous set improved considerably: 
from 45.0% to 61.1%. 
 This diagnosis, however, is open to criticism because it is based on measurements 
that only take into account the modifications taking place at the extremes of the 
distribution. Therefore, a Lorenz curve is produced for 1986 and 1998  - and the relevant 
Gini coefficients calculated - for the purpose of offering a better picture of regional 
inequality in the EU. As it may be observed in Figure 1, the curve for 1998 is closer to the 
45º line9 than the one for 1986, which confirms the diagnosis that regional income 
distribution is more equitable in 1998 than in the earlier year. In fact, during the whole 
period the Gini index dropped from 0.175 to 0.15110. This decrease in regional inequality, 
however, was not uniform all the time, since it increased slightly during the 1993 
recession, as is made clear by the trend in the Gini index represented in Figure 2. Note that 
this matches up with the results of other studies. Thus, in Martín (1999) it is pointed out 
that inequality tends to decrease in periods of economic expansion and to level off or slip 
back in times of recession. In short, the analysis carried out on the basis of the calculation 
of the measurements used in previous studies by the European Commission enables us to 
conclude that the territorial distribution of income in the EU was more equitable in 1998 
than in 1986. 
These indicators, however, do not allow us to ascertain the extent to which this 
improvement in territorial equity in the EU is attributable to the regions and/or to the 
Member States. We have therefore calculated Theil's index (0), which does indeed provide 
this information. Certainly, as may be seen in Table 1, this measurement confirms, first of 
all, the reduction in the spatial inequality of income in the EU, from 0.057 to 0.03411.  
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that these values do not match up exactly with those offered by the Second Cohesion 
Report (2001), since in the calculations for the present paper we have homogenized the series to include 
Sweden, Finland, Austria and the new Länder of the former German Democratic Republic from the start of 
the period, 1986. We did this in order to make comparable all the data we are using in the time series 
1986-1998. Note that if we included these regions only since 1991, all the other regions would increase 
significantly their relative GDP per capita in that year, distorting our estimations. In addition to this, the 
Second Cohesion Report defines the top and bottom regions in terms of the population they cover instead 
of the number of regions as reported in the First Cohesion Report (1996) and Sixth Periodic Report on the 
Social and Economic Situation and Development of Regions in the European Union (1999).  
9
 The Lorenz curve relates the accumulated proportion of income to that of the population, with per capita 
income arranged in descending order. In our case, the individuals are the 210 regions of the EU at a NUTS II 
level of disaggregation with an associated frequency equivalent to the proportion of their population to the 
total. Thus, the smaller the area between the curve and the 45º line, the more equitable the income distribution 
is. Due to its construction, the Lorenz curve only allows us to compare two distributions when the curves do 
not intersect.  
10
 Note that the computation of the Gini index for the EU(12) - excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
the regions of East Germany  -  provides similar results: a drop from 0.162 in 1986 to 0.150 in 1998. 
11
 If we exclude East Germany, Austria, Finland and Sweden we obtain values for the Theil's index (0) of 
0.045 in 1986 and 0.037 in 1998, showing again a reduction of spatial inequality, although to a lesser 
extent than when these regions are included. 
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Table 1: Regional and state member contribution to the total income disparities in the EU 
(1986 and 1998) 
 
   Theil (O) index 
 
1986 
 
1998 
Austria 0.026  0.028 
Belgium 0.026  0.025 
Denmark* -  - 
Finland 0.014  0.027 
France 0.032  0.032 
Germany 0.107  0.030 
Greece 0.005  0.013 
Holland 0.015  0.010 
Ireland* -  - 
Italy 0.035  0.042 
Luxembourg* -  - 
Portugal 0.038  0.017 
Spain 0.020  0.028 
Sweden 0.004  0.012 
United Kingdom 0.017  0.021 
    
Total regional inequity 0.042  0.027 
State inequity 0.015  0.007 
    
EU inequity 0.057  0.034 
 
Note: Denmark and Luxembourg do not have any disaggregation area at NUTS II level.  Ireland is divided 
into two areas only since 1997. 
Source: Own elaboration starting from the REGIO Data Base of Eurostat. 
Furthermore, in the second place, it offers evidence that both inter-country 
differences (from 0.015 to 0.007) and inter-region  differences (from 0.042 to 0.027) have 
contributed to this decrease, although, in relative terms, the reduction was greater in the 
case of the Member States. Precisely, owing to the consistent breakdown provided by 
Theil's index (0), it may be stated that the differences in income on the national level 
(0.007) are only responsible for 20.6% of the inequalities recorded in the EU in 1998 
(0.035). Lastly, the decrease in total regional inequality - which is obtained as the weighted 
sum of the regional inequity in each State - varied considerably: while the index dropped 
very significantly in Portugal and Germany, it increased in the majority of the Member 
States, above all in the Nordic countries12. 
                                                 
12 The Theil's Index with β=0 is a sum of a disparity measure log (U/Xi)  (where U is the average GDP per 
capita of the total area, and Xi the GDP per capita of each region) weighted by the share of population. 
Thus, Theil (0) is computed for each country using its regional data. The weighted sum of these indices 
measures, therefore, regional inequity. Then, the State inequity is calculated using the data of each 
country. Finally, using the data for the 210 regions as if all of them were part of the same area we arrive 
to the EU inequity, which can also be obtained as the sum of total regional and State inequity. 
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Figure 1: Regional income distribution in the EU (1986 and 1998): Lorenz curve
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Figure 2: Gini coefficient of the regional income distribution in the EU (1986-1998)
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 It is of particular interest, that a wide variety is observed across the countries in 
the cohesion group. Thus, Portugal has improved equity of income distribution 
considerably due to the spectacular development of three regions which were very laggard 
in 1986: Centre, Alentejo and Algarve. On the other hand, Greece, which started from one 
of the lowest levels of inequality, with an index of 0.005 in 1986, almost tripled it (0.013) 
by 1998. In Spain, Catalonia and the Community of Madrid have experienced a rate of 
convergence that many other regions have not been able to follow. Hence, for Spain 
Theil's index (0) has shown an increase, albeit to a lesser extent than for Greece. As for 
Ireland, which in 1997 was disaggregated into two areas: the South and the East (where 
Dublin is located), the gap between these two is appreciable: whereas the former area 
enjoyed a per capita income in relation to the EU average of 118.5% in 1998, the latter's 
was only at 79.3%.  
 In short, in the cohesion group we find two different models for approaching the 
EU per capita income, typified by Portugal and Greece. While Portugal approached the 
standards of EU economic well-being and at the same time reduced its internal regional 
differences, Greece caught up and simultaneously increased it spatial inequality13.  
 In any case, it should be pointed out that the inequality indicators applied so far do 
not allow us to capture the dynamics of territorial income distribution satisfactorily. It is 
therefore advisable to resort to the convergence indicators mentioned in section 3.1. In this 
respect, we begin with the simplest indicator: the absolute β-convergence index. The 
method used for its calculation will be the one put forward by Cuadrado, García and 
Raymond (1999), which only differs from the more well-known 'Barro type regression' in 
that the former uses the rate of growth of the regions defined in relation to the average 
growth of the area14: 
  
∆ln GDPi,t  - ∆ln GDPEU,t = β (ln GDPi,t-1 - ln GDPEU,t-1) + εi,t (1) 
 Where: 
GDPEU,t per capita income of the EU in purchasing power standard (PPS) in year t 
GDPi,t  per capita income of the region or country i in PPS in year t 
i  15 Member States for country convergence and 210 regions of the EU at 
the NUTS II level of disaggregation for regional convergence 
t  all the years in the period 1986-1998 
                                                 
13
 Note that Greece would have shown the same trend as presented above if we have had 
considered its full EU membership period. Indeed, the Theil (0) index for 1981 is 0.006, which 
is pretty close to that of 0.005 corresponding to 1986. 
14
 The main advantage of this methodology is that it enables conditional β-convergence to be 
estimated without the need to establish the variables determinant of the steady state of the regions, 
besides allowing us to examine both the cross-section and the time dimension. 
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Table 2: Estimated β-convergence in the EU (1986-1998) 
 
 
Estimated 
equation 
 
 
∆ln GDPi,t - ∆ln GDPEU,t = β (ln GDPi,t-1 - ln GDPEU,t-1) + εi,t 
 
Estimation 
 
 
Absolute β 
 
Conditional β 
 
 
 
 
Regional 
 
States 
 
Regional 
(within) 
 
States 
(GLS) 
 
β 
 
 
-0.026 
(-8.269) 
 
 
-0.039 
(-4.827) 
 
-0.122 
(-6.427) 
 
-0.031 
(-2.226) 
 
N observations 
 
 
2520 
 
180 
 
2520 
 
180 
 
 
Adjusted R2   
 
0.0596 
 
0.0996 
 
0.2643 
 
0.0509 
 
 
 
Hausman Test 
CHISQ(1) 
 
   
 
230.24 
 
 
1.11 
 
Test A=Ai 
F(209,2309) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
2.22 
 
 
- 
 
In parenthesis White´s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics. 
 
 As it may be seen in Table 2 that we estimate two different equations.  The first 
one by using country data of the 15 Member States and the second one by employing 
210 regions of the EU at the NUTS II level. The β coefficient is negative and significant 
in both cases, although the rate of convergence at Member State level, 3.9%, is higher 
than the regional rate, which stands at 2.6%. It should be pointed out, however, that the 
results obtained for the case of the estimation of regional convergence may be biased by 
the 'country effect', i.e.: by the fact that growth is more affected by the development of the 
country to which regions belong than by the actual features of the region.  
Consequently, we proceed in two ways to confirm that there has been regional 
convergence. First, equation (1) is estimated for the 210 regions including a dummy for the 
15 Member States that takes value 1 if the region belongs to a particular country and 0 if 
otherwise. Thus, we reduce the spatial self-correlation caused by the fact of the regions 
belonging to the same geographical areas (Armstrong, 1995). In this way we obtain the 
same result for β-convergence, -0.026, as when excluding these country dummies. 
Second, the same equation (1) is estimated but taking the regional GDP per capita in 
relation to the country average to which each region belongs rather than in relation to the 
EU. By means of this procedure, similar to that used in Rodríguez-Pose (1996), an 
estimate of the rate of regional convergence of 2.3% is obtained. Hence, from both 
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procedures, it may be verified that, apart from the 'country effect' there is a convergent 
tendency specific of the regions. 
 It should be remembered, however, that the estimations made so far consider that 
all the areas have the same steady state. Therefore, and in order to be able to detect the 
possible existence of the different steady states for each country or region, two new 
estimations of the equation (1) will be performed for state and regional convergence by 
means of the panel data procedure. The first is the within (fixed effects) through the 
estimation of equation (1) including per country dummy in the case of state 
convergence, and per region dummy for regional convergence. This procedure allows 
for different steady states for each country or region. The second is the Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimation (random effects) of the pooled data, imposing a 
common intercept and, therefore, assuming the same steady state for each country or 
region. The latter estimate is more efficient than the former but will be biased if there is 
correlation between unobservable effects and explanatory variables. Hence, we have 
carried out Hausman Test of the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
unobservable effects and the explanatory variables15. 
Table 2 sets out the results obtained in this new estimation. Thus, for the case of 
the regions, Hausman's test indicates that the individual effects are correlated with per 
capita income, so a within estimation is performed to avoid bias16. In this way, an 
estimation for the rate of conditional convergence of 12.2% is obtained, much higher than 
that obtained for absolute convergence. This significant increase is due to the fact that the 
individual effects of each region display a positive correlation with per capita income. In 
fact, the F test rejects that these effects are the same for every region, which may indicate 
that convergence is taking place to different equilibrium income levels17. Hausman's test 
does not dismiss the hypothesis that there is no correlation between the individual effects 
(at country level) and per capita income. A GLS estimate was therefore undertaken in 
order to increase the degree of efficiency. Accordingly, a value for the conditional β of 
3.1% is obtained. Note that this magnitude cannot be compared with that obtained with 
                                                 
15 
 If the hypothesis is rejected, we run the single unbiased estimator (within estimates). If it is 
not rejected, we proceed with the GLS estimates because, in addition to being unbiased, they 
will be the most efficient. So, there would be absolute convergence in two cases: firstly if the 
GLS estimator is unbiased and hence we do not include any other variable apart from the 
previous year’s relative income per capita as an explanatory variable for the rate of change; and 
secondly if only the within estimator is unbiased, but we can not reject the hypothesis of country 
dummies being equal for all the countries (De la Fuente, 2000). In this case all the countries or 
regions will converge to the same steady state. On the other hand, if β is negative but the only 
unbiased regression is the within estimates and we reject the hypothesis of all the individual 
effects being the same, then there is conditional convergence. Consequently, all countries or 
regions will be converging to different steady states. 
16
 As may be verified in Table 2, the hypothesis that individual effects are not correlated with the 
explicative variable is rejected at a 1% level of significance. 
17
 Panel data estimation of the afore-mentioned regression enables us to observe whether there are 
significant individual effects, but not to explore what those factors specific of each region may be. 
Furthermore, the fact that the individual effects are different may indicate that, although there has 
been a convergence process in an integrated area, this process may not continue taking place in the 
future (De la Fuente, 2000).      
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the within estimation for the regions, as it is a case of different procedures. In addition, the 
fact that there are no time-constant individual effects justifying the differences in per 
capita income suggests that EU partners are converging to the same income level in the 
long term.  
 In short, the most laggard areas of the EU have grown to a greater extent than the 
most prosperous ones over the period 1986-1998.  
 However, to ascertain that a convergence process has taken place in Europe, it is 
necessary to calculate the σ-convergence, since, as argued in Sala-i-Martin (1995), β-
convergence, both absolute and conditional, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. 
Thus, on the basis of σ-convergence, it may be established that the EU has experienced a 
decrease in regional disparities from 0.357 in 1986 to 0.266 in 199818. Convergence 
between Member States has been even greater, as disparities decreased from 0.033 to less 
than half, 0.015.  
 Finally, the value of γ-convergence confirms the results obtained by σ-
convergence. In fact, in the regional context convergence has been minimal, as in a rank 
between 0 (when the ranking is modified completely) and 1 (if the ranking is not altered) 
the index obtained stands at 0.9619. Again, the convergence estimated with respect to the 
Member States is much higher: 0.8320.      
 In conclusion, all the convergence estimations performed suggest that EU 
Members States converge to the same steady state, whereas the regions do so to different 
ones and at a slower pace. 
3.3. The case of the Cohesion countries 
 The four countries whose per capita income was significantly below the EU 
average during the 1990s - Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain - are those referred to as 
"cohesion countries". 
 In assessing their real convergence patterns, we will look at the trend of their 
respective per capita GDP in relation to the EU average expressed in PPS (Purchasing 
Power Standard). Specifically, Figure 3 shows the evolution of this indicator for each of 
the four cohesion countries, over the 1960-2000 period. Compared with their starting 
levels in 1960, all four countries can be said to have succeeded in catching-up, at least 
to some extent, to the EU average. However, the experience of the four countries in this 
period was very different. Ireland, whose income level is now above the EU average, is 
the most successful of the four and Greece the least21. 
                                                 
18 
 For the EU(12) regions these indices are 0.337 in 1986 and 0.290 in 1998. 
19
 If the binary Kendall index, which only uses the information of 1986 and 1998, is calculated 
instead of the multi-annual index, which uses all the data of the period, an index of 0.93 is 
obtained. In both cases the test is significant at 1%, so it is rejected that there is no association 
between the rankings of different years. This statistic is distributed as a chi-square. For the EU(12) 
regions the result is 0.97. 
20
 The binary Kendall index is 0.82 and both are significant at 1%. 
21
 It should be note that Ireland's income level is about 10 percentage points lower if measured in 
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 The intensity of the catch-up process has varied over the time, so that, with the 
sole exception of Greece in the early years after its accession, the cohesion countries 
show a better performance after their membership. Again, the case of Ireland proves to 
be particularly impressive  in this respect. Thus, over the 90s no other EU member has 
been able to match its outstanding growth performance. 
 Such differences across member countries suggest that, far from being 
spontaneous, their respective process of real convergence is largely attributable to 
differences in their respective growth strategies.  
 
Figure 3. Per capita GDP in the 
Cohesion Countries (1960-2000)
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terms of GNP per capita, mainly due to the significant presence of multinational firms whose 
repatriated profits are not included in the GNP. 
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4. Main determinants of real convergence of the Cohesion countries in  
the EU 
Proceeding with our aim of achieving an adequate diagnosis of real convergence 
experiences for less developed EU members, we will now first take into account the 
factors that, according to the soundest theoretical and empirical evidence, are the main 
determinants of growth in the medium and long term. That is to say, we will make and 
assessment of the endowments of the cohesion countries in both physical and intangible 
capital, as well as their investment efforts to increase them. 
Secondly, we will explore the likely contribution of international technological 
spillovers  -  through trade and foreign direct investments  -  in the catch-up experiences 
of the four less developed EU members. And finally we will analyze the role played by 
the EU’s Regional policy. 
4.1. National growth policies  
 According to the evidence on the determining factors of economic growth – 
recall what was summarized in section 2 – it is reasonable to expect that the across-
countries differences found in the real convergence process of the cohesion countries 
have to do with the differences in their respective strategies of capitalization on both 
kinds of capital endowments: physical and intangible.  
 Regarding the level and trends in physical capital endowments we  proceed first 
to estimate the stocks of private capital. Accumulation is calculated on the base of the 
respective series of private Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), conveniently 
deflated and depreciated under the Perpetual Inventory Method. Then, the stocks of 
public capital are to be obtained by applying the same procedure to the corresponding 
series of public GFCF. Finally, we  attempt an assessment of the transport infrastructure 
endowment by calculating the arithmetic mean of the availability of a kind of standard 
motorway per square km and per capita (see Martín, 2000 for more details). 
 The values estimated for all these kinds of physical capital endowments are 
shown in Figure 4. The figure shows that, as expected, the various endowments are 
generally larger in those of the four Cohesion members that have been more successful 
in narrowing their per capita GDP to the EU average than the rest. 
 As for the stock of technological capital, there is a wide consensus that it can be 
reasonably well estimated by the accumulation of the R&D spending following the 
perpetual inventory method22. We have, therefore, applied this method to the series of 
data on R&D starting 1973 (provided by the OECD), using as a deflator that of the 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation and assuming a depreciation rate of 10%.  
                                                 
22
 The use of the R&D expenditures as an indicator for the technological development has received 
two kinds of criticism. On the one hand, it has been claimed that R&D spending is an overstated 
measure of the efforts in technological activities in view of the high rates of failures that are likely 
to occur in R&D projects. On the other hand, others have argued that it is under-estimated, because 
it does not include the payments for imports of technology. 
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Figure 4: Capital endowments in the cohesion countries and the EU 
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 As regards the estimation of human capital stock, it should be pointed out that 
the best procedure used up to now is the one followed in Barro and Lee (1993 and 
1996). This procedure approaches the human stock of a country in terms of the level of 
training of its working-age population according to the years of schooling at all levels of 
education. While we will essentially follow this method, we will introduce an 
improvement trying to overcome the criticisms that the Barro and Lee (1993 and 1996) 
estimates received, namely that they do not take into the consideration the likely 
differences of quality across the education systems of the countries. Consequently, our 
estimated series of human capital stock introduce a correction, based on data on the 
cross country differences in education expenditure per student at every level of 
teaching, in an attempt to get data in terms of the same quality standard. More details 
about the data sources and the procedure used for the measurement of these spillovers 
are provided in BOX 1 below.  
 The estimated values for these two intangible capital endowment indicators for 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece – all of them in relation to those of the EU average 
in the years 1980 and 1998 - are presented in the same Figure 4. From examining the 
figure on technology capital we deduce, among other things, that all the cohesion 
countries, with the exception of Ireland, have been far behind the EU average. The gap 
has, however, diminished significantly over time (except for the case of Ireland). This is 
explained by the stronger rate of investment in R&D in the most backward member 
countries during most of the period of reference and by the slowdown in R&D spending 
in some countries, such as Germany, which have got a bigger stock of technological 
capital.    
 As for the stock of human capital the cohesion countries also show a significant 
but decreasing gap in relation to the EU average (except for Greece). Among the four 
laggard countries we should underline the special efforts made by the Spanish economy 
in the given period.  
 Overall, the differentials found in the level and path of technological and human 
capital stocks across the four cohesion countries appear to confirm the hypothesis of the 
endogenous growth theories which stress the importance of the role of these factors in 
the growth and economic real convergence of countries. 
4.2. International technological spillovers 
 Once we have found that underlying the catch-up process in per capita GDP of the 
laggard EU members there have been the important efforts to increase their tangible and 
intangible capital endowments, it seems interesting to explore the likely contribution of 
international technological spillovers to this process. 
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BOX 1. CALCULATIONS OF CAPITAL ENDOWMENTS 
• Stock of private and public physical capital: 
Data for each country was estimated on the basis of the accumulation of 
investment flows since 1960 under the perpetual inventory method. The series on the 
private and public GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and their deflators are those 
which figure in OECD: National Accounts, Vol. 1, Main Aggregates. The depreciation 
rate is 5.4% and was obtained from EUROSTAT (1997). 
• Stock of transport infrastructure: 
Data for each country was estimated on the basis of the weighted sum of km of 
local, regional and national roads and motorways for each year. The series on the km 
of roads and motorways are those which figure in United Nations: Annual Bulletin of 
Transport Infrastructure for Europe and North America. See Martín (2000) for more 
details. 
• Stock of technological capital: 
Data for each country was estimated on the basis of the accumulation of R&D 
expenditure since 1973 under the perpetual inventory method (with a lag of two years) 
and assuming a 10% depreciation rate, based on data obtained from OECD: Main 
Science and Technology Indicators; Basic Science and Technology Statistics; and 
Research and Development Expenditure in Industry. 
• Stock of human capital: 
The human capital stock is estimated through a formulation similar to the 
perpetual inventory method; that is, by adding up the number of students enrolled each 
year since 1930 at all educational levels (primary, secondary, technical and higher 
education) who are of working age in the year for which the indicator is calculated, 
previously weighted by the ratio between expenditure per student at each level of 
education and in each country, and the average total cost of educating a university 
student in the EU. The advantage of this procedure, in addition to its easy updating, is 
that it allows us to take into account that the disparities in expenditure per student 
across different educational levels and countries indicate different quality. The original 
sources of data are: UNESCO: Statistical Yearbook, and OECD: Education at a 
Glance. See Martín (2000) for more details. 
 
 Indeed, as was mentioned in section 2, recent growth literature has not only 
emphasized the importance of domestic R&D and human capital investments, but also 
that of the international diffusion of technology through different channels. Thus, in 
addition to the most conventional and direct channel, the international contracts for 
transfer of technology, the new growth models have stressed two other indirect ways for 
international diffusion of technology: those due to the assumed existence of knowledge 
spillover effects channeled through trade and foreign direct investment. Consequently, 
in these models, at a given level of domestic stock of technological and human capital, 
the processes of opening up and integration of a country will tend to raise its rate of 
growth. 
 Following this line of reasoning, we will pursue our analysis of real convergence 
for the four target countries by trying to approach the relative importance of their 
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capability to benefit from foreign technological innovations through the three channels 
mentioned above.  
 In view of the fact that the four countries have concentrated their imports of 
goods and technology as well as their direct investment inflows in the OECD countries, 
we will consider this area as the origin of all their knowledge spillovers through each of 
these ways. To begin with, we have estimated the extent of technological spillovers 
coming from technology imports on the basis of the accumulation of the series of 
technology import payments under the perpetual inventory method. As for the spillovers 
incorporated in the direct investment inflows, we have calculated a weighted average of 
technology capital in the OECD member countries using as weights the stocks of 
foreign capital received from each of them. Finally, technological spillovers through 
imports of goods have been estimated by an analogous procedure but here using as 
weights the imports coming from each one of the OECD countries. More details about 
the data sources and the procedure used for the measurement of these spillovers are 
provided in BOX 2 below.  
The results obtained in our estimation of the importance of those three channels 
of diffusion of foreign technologies are presented in Figure 5. As expected, in the light 
of their relatively lower stocks of technological capital from a domestic origin, 
technological change in the four less developed EU countries seems to have been based 
to a great extent on the diffusion of foreign innovations.  
 A short glance at the different channels reveals some interesting features. Apart 
from the leading role of imports in all countries, the most salient feature is the 
extraordinary importance of foreign direct investment in Ireland and also, although to a 
lesser degree, in Spain and Portugal. Moreover, as it has been argued in other places 
(see OECD, 1999 and Barry, 1999) foreign direct investment has played a crucial role 
not only in the technological modernization but also in the transformation of the Irish 
economy. The traditional scarcity of inward investment flows in Greece makes the 
rather poor performance of this country as regards labor productivity easier to 
understand.  
A more descriptive analysis of the trends of direct investment inflows in each 
country - which have given rise to cumulative data graphically reported in Figure 5 -  
reflects that in the case of Ireland the bulk of these investments have taken place since 
the beginning of the 1990s, (see Figure 6), that is to say, since the eve of the formation 
of the European Single Market. The major share of those capital inflows come from 
USA and are concentrated in a rather small number of sectors which exhibit a salient 
export performance. All these facts suggest, therefore, that Ireland has been chosen by 
American investors as a base to supply all the EU market.  
It is interesting to denote that this inward direct investment boom in Ireland 
seems to have been on the basis of the clear reorientation of both productive and trade 
structures towards skilled-labor and technology-intensive sectors observed in the 90s in 
the Irish economy. In this sense it is of interest to note that the trend in foreign direct 
investment and that corresponding to the increasing share of technology-intensive 
sectors have gone in parallel. In addition, in OECD (1999) it is documented in more 
detail that inward investment has been vital in the creation of an export-oriented, 
skilled-labor-intensive sector, concentrated in areas such as electronics, pharmaceuticals 
and corporate services.  
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BOX 2. MEASUREMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL 
SPILLOVERS BY CHANNELS 
• Foreign Capital (TSfc): 
Phk
Tk
GDP
Fc
TSfc
jt
jtn
j it
i
jt
it ∑=
=1
 
where, 
Fc: Stock of foreign capital in country i from country j. The values of this variable were 
obtained from OECD: International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. Given the 
disparities found between data for the source and host countries, the statistics had to 
undergo a data-editing process. 
Tk: Stock of technological capital. Data for each country was estimated on the basis of the 
accumulation of R&D expenditure since1973 under the perpetual inventory method 
(with a lag of two years) and assuming a 10% depreciation rate, based on data obtained 
from OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators; Basic Science andTechnology 
Statistics; and Research and Development Expenditure in Industry. 
Phk: Physical capital. Data for  each country was estimated on the basis of the accumulation 
of investment flows since 1960 under the perpetual inventory method. The series on the 
GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) and their deflators are those which figure in 
OECD: National Accounts, Vol. 1, Main Aggregates. The depreciation rate is 5.4% and 
was obtained from EUROSTAT (1997). 
i and j are referred to the host and the source country of the flows of foreign capital.  
n is the number of countries considered. In this case all OECD countries. 
• Good Imports (TSm): 
∑=
=
n
j jt
jt
it
i
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it GDP
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GDP
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1
 
where, 
M: Imports of country i from country j. Data on bilateral trade flows were drawn from the 
IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. To overcome the problem of the lack of 
coincidence between the trade data from the standpoint of imports (fob) and of exports 
(fob), the arithmetical mean between both of them was calculated. 
• Technological imports (TStm): 
GDPit
tm itp it
pitMtm it
GDPit
Mtm itTStm it
+
−
−
−
=
= 1
)1(1 δ
 
where, 
Mtm: Accumulated technological imports from 1973, calculated by the perpetual inventory 
method. 
tm: technological imports per year obtained from IMF: Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook, EUROSTAT: Balance of Payments. Quarterly Statistics and OECD: Basic 
Science and Technology Statistics.  
δ: Depreciation rate. In this case the depreciation rate is 10% as in Mohnen et al. (1986) 
and Bernstein and Nadiri (1989). 
p: Deflator of Gross Fixed Capital Formation obtained from OECD: National Accounts. Vol. 
I: Main Aggregates 
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Source: OECD: National Accounts. Main Aggregates; OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators; OECD: Basic Science and Technology 
Statistics; OECD: Services. Statistics on International Transactions; EUROSTAT: International Trade in Services; EUROSTAT: Balance of Payments; 
IMF: Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and own elaboration. 
Figure 5. Cumulative technological spillovers in 1996
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Source: OECD: International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook; EUROSTAT: European 
Union Direct Investment Yearbook; UN: World Investment Report and own elaboration. 
 
 Needless to say, the diagnosis of real convergence achievements in the EU 
cohesion countries would be very limited if it did not discuss the contribution of the EU 
regional policy. We will devote, therefore, the next section to a consideration of this 
important issue. 
4.3. The Regional dimension in the EU Budget 
 In this section we will examine the role played by the Community budget, and 
especially by the Structural Measures, in the convergence observed in the EU. In this 
respect, it is advisable to start off by pointing out that the limit established for EU 
budgetary spending is 1.27% of the GNP of the Fifteen, whereas national public spending 
for the average of the Member States amounts, according to European Commission data, 
to 46.3%. This therefore shows that the scope of any EU budgetary-based policy is rather 
limited.  
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 In the last few years, however, the Community budget has undergone major 
changes in its composition, particularly on the expenditure side, which may have affected 
the spatial distribution of income in the EU. Thus, since 1986 a substantial increase has 
taken place in the share of the Structural Measures in total EU expenditure: from just 15% 
in 1986 they have gone up to represent over 35% at the present time, while the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has declined in importance, but without ceasing to be the most 
substantial item, accounting for close to 45%.  
 Generally speaking, it is observed that the Member States with lower per capita 
income - the recipients of the Cohesion Fund - have been increasing their net balances 
with the EU (see Table 3). In this respect, we may single out the case of Ireland, which 
was receiving funds to the tune of 5% of its GDP until the mid-1990s. The second country 
that has most benefited from the EU regional policy is Greece, which has obtained funds 
of an annual amount of around 4% of its GDP. Lastly come Portugal and Spain. Note that 
the position regarding the receipt of budgetary funds seems to have been more associated 
with the seniority of the countries being members of the Union than with their relative 
development level. This leads us to think that the experience gained in participating in EU 
regional policy programs confers an advantageous position for benefiting from it23.   
 Overall, the distribution of all the budgetary resources of the Fifteen may be said to 
have become more equitable with time. In fact, if the two Lorenz pseudo-curves produced 
from statistics of 1986 and 1998 are compared, in a way analogous to that used in Martín 
(2000)24, it is confirmed that distribution of funds was more equitable in the latter year (see 
Figure 7).  
 
                                                 
23
 Furthermore, as showed by Kandogan (2000), once countries join the EU they may use their 
votes to modify the budgetary rules and improve the percentage of the Community funds they 
receive. 
24 Lorenz' pseudo-curve is an extremely useful instrument for analyzing the regional dimension of 
taxes and expenditure. Specifically, by comparing the accumulated income of the countries making 
up the EU, arranged in descending order of per capita income, with the resources received from the 
EU also expressed in cumulative terms, we may deduce whether  expenditures have contributed to 
territorial equity (when the curve is situated above the 45º line) or whether they have not done so.  
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Table 3: Community budget: contributions, revenue and net balance of the EU countries 
 
             
 Average annual contributions to Community budget 
(% of GDP) 
 Average annual revenue to Community budget 
(% of GDP) 
 Average annual budget balance 
(% of GDP) 
                        
 Country  1986-88  1989-93  1994-98  Country  1986-
88 
 1989-
93 
 1994-
98 
 Country  1986-
88 
 1989-
93 
 1994-
98 
 
 
 
                      
 1. Austria      0.9  1. Austria      0.6  1. Austria      -0.3  
 2. Belgium  1.3  1.3  1.4  2. Belgium  0.8  1.1  1.0  2. Belgium  -0.5  -0.2  -0.4  
 3. Denmark       
1.0 
        
0.9 
    1.0  3. Denmark  1.4  1.2  1.1  3. Denmark  0.4  0.3  0.1  
 4. Finland      0.8  4. Finland      0.7  4. Finland      -0.1  
 5. France  1.0  1.0  1.1  5. France  0.9  0.8  0.9  5. France  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  
 6. Germany  0.9  1.0  1.1  6. Germany  0.5  0.4  0.5  6. Germany  -0.5  -0.6  -0.7  
 7. Greece  0.9  1.0  1.1  7. Greece  3.7  5.2  5.4  7. Greece  2.8  4.2  4.2  
 8. Holland  1.3  1.4  1.5  8. Holland  1.6  1.3  0.7  8. Holland  0.3  -0.1  -0.7  
 9. Ireland  1.2  1.2  1.3  9. Ireland  5.4  6.5  5.0  9. Ireland  4.2 
 
5.3 
 
3.7  
 10. Italy  0.8  0.9  0.9  10. Italy  0.8  0.8  0.7  10. Italy  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  
 11. Luxembourg  1.2  1.2  1.3  11. Luxembourg  0.2  1.9  1.3  11. Luxembourg  -1.0  0.7  0.0  
 12. Portugal  0.9  1.1  1.2  12. Portugal  1.9  3.4  4.1  12. Portugal  1.0 
 
2.3 
 
2.9  
 13. Spain  0.9  1.1  1.1  13. Spain  1.1  1.6  2.3  13. Spain  0.2 
 
0.5 
 
1.3  
 14. Sweden      0.9  14. Sweden      0.4  14. Sweden      -0.4  
 15. United Kingdom  0.8  0.8  0.9  15. United 
Kingdom 
 0.5  0.5  0.6  15. United 
Kingdom 
 
  -0.3       -0.3  -0.3  
 
 
                       
 
Source: European Court of Auditors: Annual Report; European Commission: The Community Budget: the Facts in Figures and own elaboration. 
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Figure 7:  Concentration of Resources Received from the Community Budget by EU Countries* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* To be able to compare the curves for 1986 and 1998 they were calculated for the countries which formed part of the European Union throughout 
the period. Nonetheless, the curve for 1998 that includes all 15 members is very similar. 
Source: European Court of Auditors: Annual Report; European Commission: The Community Budget: the Facts in Figures; OCDE: National Accounts. Volumen I: Main Aggregates and own 
elaboration 
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 Having analyzed the net contribution of the individual Member States to the 
Community budget, it is of interest to find out what the specific incidence of each one of 
the actions financed by the Budget has been. One way of doing this is by calculating Gini's 
pseudo-indices of the distribution of the items of expenditure associated with each type of 
policy amongst the different Member States25. The values obtained - shown in Table 4 - 
underline the fact that expenditures under the EAGGF-Guarantee Section (the European 
Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund) made no contribution to convergence at the 
start of the period26:  the Gini's coefficient of these expenditures was negative (-0,05); 
later, however, these expenditures were restructured and led to a favorable effect 
(+0.16)27. Similarly, it is deduced that Structural Measures were more effective in 1998 
than in 1986 in their aim of fomenting economic and social cohesion, as the index rose 
from 0.36 to 0.46. Lastly, insofar as funds allocated to R&D activities are concerned, it 
should be pointed out that the Framework Program funds have focused traditionally on a 
series of twelve 'innovation islands' situated in the most advanced EU countries. A few 
recent initiatives of the Commission, however, have helped the cohesion group to step up 
their participation in the Framework Program, as is underlined by the value attained by 
Gini's index (+0.03).  
 In short, the data analyzed suggests that the Community Budget has been largely 
benefiting the less prosperous countries of the EU, particularly through the Structural 
Measures.  
 
                                                 
25
 Thus, in the case of the resources received from the EU Budget by each country, a positive index 
represents a equalitarian effect. In addition, the pseudo-index for the total expenditure is obtained 
as the weighted sum of every one of its components, so it is possible to analyze the contribution of 
the different policies to the improvement (or deterioration) of the equity achieved (see, Martín 
2000). Martín (2000) uses this procedure for each item of income, and it turns out that only slight 
progress is made towards cohesion in the case of the contributions made in the form of VAT. 
26
 In De la Dehesa and Krugman (1992) and the references of studies on the subject provided there, 
conclusive results are offered on the inequity of this policy in the eighties. 
27
  A similar conclusion is reached in Zanias (1994). 
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Table 4: Distribution of Resources from the EU Budget to the Cohesion Countries and the Rest of Member Countries 
 
1986 
 
 
Resources from: 
 
  
 
 
GDP in euro 
(%) 
 
EAGGF 
Guarantee 
Structural 
measures 
R&D Total 
 
Cohesion (P, GR, E and IRL) 9.4 13.1 29.3  21.0 
 
Rest 
 
 
 
90.6 86.9 60.7  79.0 
 
Gini coefficient 
 
 -0.05 0.36  0.08 
1998 
 
 
 
 
Resources from: 
 
  
 
 GDP in euro 
(%) 
 
EAGGF 
Guarantee 
Structural 
measures 
R&D Total 
 
Cohesion (P, GR, E and IRL) 10.4 26.1 52.1 11.7 35.3 
 
Rest 
 
 
 
89.6 73.9 47.9 88.3 64.7 
 
Gini coefficient * 
 
 0.16 0.46 0.03 0.27 
 
* To compare the coefficients for 1986 and 1998 they were calculated by including the countries which belonged to the European Union throughout the 
period. Nonetheless, note that the value of the coefficient calculated for 1998 that includes the 15 members is very similar. 
Source: European Court of Auditors: Annual Report; European Commission: The Community Budget: the Facts in Figures; OECD: National Accounts. 
Volume I: Main Aggregates and own elaboration. 
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 It should be pointed out, however, that the analysis carried out does not allow us to 
estimate the extent to which the increase in the budgetary funds received by the cohesion 
group has contributed to the improvement that has taken place in income convergence 
across the members of the EU. Various studies have shown, however, that Structural 
Measures have indeed made a significant contribution to the economic growth of the 
poorest regions and countries of the EU. Thus, Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2000) 
find a significant favorable effect of Community funds on the economic growth of the EU 
regions in the period 1989-1993, through estimation of a production function in which they 
also include initial per capita income level, percentage of industrial and agricultural 
employment and long-term unemployment28. Domenech, Maudes and Varela (2000) find 
that the Community Budget reduced per capita income differences across EU Member 
States by 5% in the period 1986-1998. The Economic and Social Cohesion Laboratory 
(1997) has also estimated that the Cohesion Fund has had a considerable impact on the 
regional and national economies of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland.  
 Lastly, another series of papers that perform macroeconomic model simulations 
find that the Structural Actions have stimulated economic growth by around 0.5 to 1 
percentage point29. Thus, Beutel (1995), using an input-output model, finds a favorable 
effect of the Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) in the countries receiving funds 
from Objective 1, whereas Herce and Sosvilla (1994 and 1999), Bradley, Modesto and 
Sosvilla (1995), Bradley (2000) and Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis (1998) - by means of 
the HERMIN model - also estimate a favorable impact of the CSFs on the cohesion group 
countries30. Finally, Roeger (1998) also finds a favorable effect of the CSFs on growth, 
employment and investment in the cohesion group by means of the QUEST II model. 
 Nevertheless, there are also some studies that question the effectiveness of the 
Structural Measures in the reduction of territorial income disparities in the EU. Thus, 
Boldrin and Canova (2000) contend that the EU regional policy has been ineffective in 
achieving the convergence of the per capita income levels of the poorest regions towards 
the richest and they even claim that this convergence will only be possible if emigration is 
fomented from the former to the latter31. Martin (1998) also maintains that financing of 
                                                 
28
 This estimation, however, may be biased by the high correlation between initial per capita 
income and the high percentage of agricultural employment with structural funds.  
29
 Lolos (2000) points out that these analyses are based on an ex ante assessment, so it is being 
implicitly assumed that the recipient countries are capable of absorbing all the funds and 
implementing the programs efficiently and that the macroeconomic conditions on which the models 
are based do not change. 
30
 Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis (2000), however, state that these favorable effects only appear 
when the externalities of the projects financed by the Commission are taken into consideration, as 
they estimate the effects on demand separately beforehand, and they find no impacts on the 
economic growth of Greece. Hence, they conclude that these projects have to be coordinated on a 
large scale if they are to be efficient.  
31
 Puga (1999), however, has devised a theoretical model in which the absence of migrations from 
the poorest to the richest regions may halt the polarization and agglomeration process. In fact, in 
this model, to begin with the integration process encourages the localization of companies in areas 
with better infrastructure through reducing transport costs, but if emigration does not take place 
from the less prosperous to the richer regions after that, companies will then tend to disperse. 
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infrastructure in the poorest regions stimulates large-scale importing of products 
manufactured in the rich areas and is therefore counterproductive for convergence. In this 
respect, he states that a more effective policy for convergence would be support for 
research and development in the regions with the lowest per capita income. 
 In short, although the evidence is not conclusive, most of the studies conducted 
suggest that the EU regional policy has had a significant favorable impact on income 
convergence in the EU. 
5. Conclusions and lessons for the Central and Eastern European 
candidates 
 This study started off by carrying out a brief survey of the convergence versus 
divergence debate, which has appeared in the most recent literature on economic growth. 
In this way, it has been made clear that neither the theory nor the empirical evidence are 
conclusive. Accordingly, it may not be affirmed that removal of the barriers to trade and to 
factor mobility between countries - as carried out between the fifteen members of the EU, 
or which will have to be carried out when the candidates join the union - will necessarily 
entail a convergence in their income levels. In fact, there are many models - particularly 
models of endogenous growth - that identify the coexistence of factors both conducive and 
contrary to convergence.  
 However, the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that convergence is the 
most likely outcome, although it is a convergence conditional upon investments on the 
part of the laggard countries (regions) in order to overcome their deficit in tangible and 
intangible capital endowments, which lies at the root of their lower level of economic 
development. In this respect, it may be claimed that governments can influence the 
capability of countries to converge toward the higher level of income in the more advanced 
countries by means of public investment, especially in the capital investments - such as 
infrastructure, R&D and human capital - which play a more decisive role in growth than 
other types of investments.  
 The results obtained when making an assessment of real convergence in the EU, 
both at country and regional level, are compatible with such hypotheses. Thus, our study 
confirms, by means of calculating the different indicators that are normally used in studies 
of this type, that in the course of the last few years a process of convergence has taken 
place between the per capita income levels of the EU regions and also, to a larger extent, 
of the Member States. More specifically, by means of estimating the beta- (absolute and 
conditional), sigma- and gamma-convergence indices, we found that the Member States 
appear to be converging towards the same steady state, whereas the regions are doing so 
towards different ones and at a slower pace.  
 As regards the countries that were of special interest in this study, the four cohesion 
countries, the advances towards convergence are noticeable in all of them. Nevertheless, 
also marked differences could be identified: Ireland is undoubtedly the most successful of 
the four, while Greece showed the least satisfactory performance. In this respect, the 
differences that may be observed between these countries suggest that, advances in real 
convergence are far from being a spontaneous outcome of the accession to the EU, but are 
largely determined by the growth strategy implemented by the countries themselves. 
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 In fact, the assessment of the physical and intangible capital endowments of these 
countries and of the investment efforts made to enlarge them, which was undertaken in 
section 4, shows that both are positively related to the progress in real convergence 
achieved in each of the cohesion countries. Furthermore, the extent of the achievements in 
terms of real convergence is apparently also associated with the varying capacity to attract 
direct foreign investments displayed by the countries. Indeed, this appears to be one of the 
essential factors to explain the exceptional path of convergence recorded by Ireland. 
 Lastly, our study suggests that the Community’s regional policy has played a 
significant role in favor of real convergence between the Member States of the EU. In this 
respect, it should be mentioned that Ireland has been precisely the country that has most 
benefited from Structural Actions, which represented a financial support of around 5% of 
its GDP. However, the experience of Greece – this was the second country most favored 
by Community regional policy funds, but it has recorded the worst results in terms of 
convergence - suggests that the impact of EU’s financial assistance on the beneficiary 
countries depends not only on its amount, but also on the efficiency with which its 
allocation is carried out.  
 All these results regarding the experience of the Member States, and especially of 
the four least developed ones, provide some useful lessons for the candidate countries 
which, like them, are going to join the EU while having an income level considerably 
below the average of the EU partners. 
One important lesson to be drawn from the experience of the four cohesion 
Member States is that the accession is likely to contribute significantly to improving the 
possibilities of the current Central and Eastern European candidates in aligning their per 
capita income levels with those of the more advanced current EU members. However, 
on the basis of the differentials found across the cohesion countries, we have also learnt 
that the prospects of growth and income convergence towards EU levels in the current 
candidates will depend crucially on the measures taken by each country, and 
particularly on their capacity to invest more and more efficiently. In this respect, there is 
little doubt that domestic efforts to increase human capital endowments and 
infrastructure are essential ingredients for taking advantage of integration in terms of 
real convergence. 
The European regional policies can be expected to be of help to fostering the 
capacity of income convergence of the Central and Eastern newcomers. Nevertheless, as 
the evidence of the current EU members show, the efficient use of the financial 
assistance is not assured. Moreover, there is a risk that the EU subsidies - the structural 
and cohesion funds - transferred to the laggard regions may generate distortions and 
waste of public resources. It seems, therefore, to be clear that the efficient use of the 
financial assistance of the EU regional policies requires that the CEECs build up an 
administrative capacity that allows appropriate monitoring and evaluation of the 
subsidized projects.  
On the basis of the catch–up experiences of the cohesion countries, the Central 
and Eastern candidates should also learn about the importance of macroeconomic 
stability as a condition for economic growth and, consequently, for real convergence. In 
this respect, the case of Greece, an economy that until recently exhibited large 
macroeconomic stabilization problems and slow catching up, is particularly illustrative. 
 32
In sum, the analysis of the convergence achievements in the EU cohesion 
countries suggests that the Central and Eastern candidates have to confront a huge task 
in order to meet what, in the end, is the ultimate goal of accession: convergence towards 
the higher standards of living of the future partners in the EU. But it also suggests that, 
in spite of the difficulty, this task is likely to be favored by integration. In addition, it 
should be pointed out that in the case of CEECs integration induced effects are 
reinforced by those stemming from the dismantling central planning.  
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